FAR and DFARS › FAR Part 16: Types of Contracts › Subpart 16.4

FAR 16.403-1 Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.

The codified text (eCFR, as of 2026-10-02). Under the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul ↗, agencies follow class deviations with new text for many parts while the formal rules go through the Federal Register: check the solicitation and your contract's clauses, which rule.

In plain English

This section describes fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts, which set a target cost, target profit, price ceiling, and profit adjustment formula at the start. The final price is determined after performance by applying the formula to the final negotiated cost, so the contractor's profit increases if costs are below target and decreases if costs are above target. If final cost exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the excess as a loss.

Applies to: Government contractors and contracting officers considering or using fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.

What it requires

  • The contracting officer shall specify in the contract Schedule the target cost, target profit, and target price for each item subject to incentive price revision.

Key terms: target cost · target profit · price ceiling · profit adjustment formula · final cost

Written by AI from this section's text. A guide, not legal advice: the text below rules.

The text

(a) Description. A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract specifies a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula. These elements are all negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses. When the contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the final price is established by applying the formula. When the final cost is less than the target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit greater than the target profit; conversely, when final cost is more than target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit less than the target profit, or even a net loss. If the final negotiated cost exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. Because the profit varies inversely with the cost, this contract type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs.

(b) Application. A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the outset a firm target cost, target profit, and profit adjustment formula that will provide a fair and reasonable incentive and a ceiling that provides for the contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk. When the contractor assumes a considerable or major share of the cost responsibility under the adjustment formula, the target profit should reflect this responsibility.

(c) Limitations. This contract type may be used only when—

(1) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for providing data to support negotiation of final cost and incentive price revision; and

(2) Adequate cost or pricing information for establishing reasonable firm targets is available at the time of initial contract negotiation.

(d) Contract Schedule. The contracting officer shall specify in the contract Schedule the target cost, target profit, and target price for each item subject to incentive price revision.

Sections that refer to it

  • 16.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts.
  • 16.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.

← 16.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts. · 16.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts. →

Rule changes for FAR Part 16

Source: eCFR, 48 CFR chapters 1 and 2 (GPO GovInfo bulk data) ↗. Plain words for the terms: glossary.

FAR 16.403-1 Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts · SpendQuery